CVE-2026-104012: Rox Appointment Booking privilege escalation via mass assignment

CVE-2026-104012 · Severity: high · CVSS 8.8 · Published 2026-10-31

The Rox Appointment Booking plugin for WordPress allows unauthenticated attackers to create poisoned customer records containing an arbitrary administrator's user ID. When a site administrator opens and saves such a record, their email address is overwritten, enabling the attacker to take over the admin account via password reset. This requires the attacker to know a valid admin user ID and the admin to interact with the malicious record.

Vendors: Rox.

Quick answers

Is CVE-2026-104012 exploited in the wild?
No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of CVE-2026-104012 being exploited in the wild.
How severe is CVE-2026-104012?
High severity, with a CVSS score of 8.8, published 31 October 2026.
Which products and versions are affected?
Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution up to and including 1.3.1.
Is there a fix for CVE-2026-104012?
Yes: fixed in 1.3.2. Junglewise finds every place you run it, drafts the upgrade and applies it once you approve.
How is CVE-2026-104012 attacked?
It is attacked over the network, in a web application.
Am I affected by CVE-2026-104012?
Check whether you run Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.

How to fix

  • Fixed in: 1.3.2

Technical details

The plugin's public REST endpoint `/rox-appointment-booking/v1/public/booking` performs unsafe mass assignment of request body fields directly into a new customer record, including the internal `wp_user_id` column. The `LinkedAccount::canChange()` method fails to validate authorization when an administrator later edits the poisoned record, allowing arbitrary email updates on the linked WordPress user account via `wp_update_user()`. Exploitation requires knowledge of a target admin user ID and admin interaction with the malicious record.

Affected products

  • Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution up to and including 1.3.1

Timeline

  • 2026-10-31: disclosed

References

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