# CVE-2026-104012: Rox Appointment Booking privilege escalation via mass assignment

Source: https://junglewise.ai/threats/cve-2026-104012-the-rox-appointment-booking-appointment-booking-scheduling  
Publisher: Junglewise Threat Intelligence, https://junglewise.ai/threats  
Published: 2026-10-31. Updated: 2026-10-31  
License: CC BY 4.0 with a link back

CVE-2026-104012 · Severity: high · CVSS 8.8 · Published 2026-10-31

The Rox Appointment Booking plugin for WordPress allows unauthenticated attackers to create poisoned customer records containing an arbitrary administrator's user ID. When a site administrator opens and saves such a record, their email address is overwritten, enabling the attacker to take over the admin account via password reset. This requires the attacker to know a valid admin user ID and the admin to interact with the malicious record.

Vendors: [Rox](https://junglewise.ai/threats/vendors/rox).

## Quick answers

**Is CVE-2026-104012 exploited in the wild?** No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of CVE-2026-104012 being exploited in the wild.

**How severe is CVE-2026-104012?** High severity, with a CVSS score of 8.8, published 31 October 2026.

**Which products and versions are affected?** Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution up to and including 1.3.1.

**Is there a fix for CVE-2026-104012?** Yes: fixed in 1.3.2. Junglewise finds every place you run it, drafts the upgrade and applies it once you approve.

**How is CVE-2026-104012 attacked?** It is attacked over the network, in a web application.

**Am I affected by CVE-2026-104012?** Check whether you run Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.

## How to fix

- Fixed in 1.3.2

## Technical details

The plugin's public REST endpoint `/rox-appointment-booking/v1/public/booking` performs unsafe mass assignment of request body fields directly into a new customer record, including the internal `wp_user_id` column. The `LinkedAccount::canChange()` method fails to validate authorization when an administrator later edits the poisoned record, allowing arbitrary email updates on the linked WordPress user account via `wp_update_user()`. Exploitation requires knowledge of a target admin user ID and admin interaction with the malicious record.

## Affected products

- Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution up to and including 1.3.1

## Timeline

- 2026-10-31: disclosed

## References

- [https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/rox-appointment-booking.1.3.2.zip](https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/rox-appointment-booking.1.3.2.zip)
- [https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/Customer/Data/CustomerModel.php](https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/Customer/Data/CustomerModel.php)