Quick answers
- Is This vulnerability exploited in the wild?
- No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of This vulnerability being exploited in the wild.
- How severe is This vulnerability?
- Medium severity, with a CVSS score of 6.5, published 2 July 2026.
- Which products and versions are affected?
- zebra-rpc (crates.io) <= 7.0.0; zebrad (crates.io) <= 4.4.1.
- Is there a fix for This vulnerability?
- No fixed version is recorded yet. Check the vendor's advisory in the references below. If you run it, Junglewise drafts a mitigation that fits your setup and applies it once you approve, with senior security engineers behind it.
- How is This vulnerability attacked?
- It is attacked over the network, in a hosted service.
- Am I affected?
- Check whether you run zebra-rpc (crates.io) or zebrad (crates.io) at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.
Technical details
The z_listunifiedreceivers RPC handler in zebrad contains a reachable assertion (panic) when processing a structurally valid but cryptographically invalid Unified Address. Specifically, the handler calls .expect() on a result from sapling_crypto::PaymentAddress::from_bytes that returns None for non-subgroup Jubjub points. Because the Zebra release profile is configured with panic = 'abort', this terminates the entire node process. An authenticated attacker (or unauthenticated if cookie auth is disabled) can trigger this via a network request to the RPC endpoint. The issue is fixed in zebrad v4.5.0 and zebra-rpc v8.0.0 by implementing proper error handling instead of a panic.
Affected products
- ZcashFoundation zebrad <= 4.4.1
- ZcashFoundation zebra-rpc <= 7.0.0
Timeline
- 2026-05-29: disclosed: Initial report via private GitHub Security Advisory
- 2026-07-02: advisory: Public advisory published