Vibe-Trading file-read tools arbitrary file disclosure

Severity: high · CVSS 7.5 · Published 2026-10-02

Vibe-Trading is an AI-powered trade analysis platform that allows users to upload and analyze financial data. Two file-reading functions lack proper access controls, allowing unauthenticated attackers to extract arbitrary files the server process can read, including system files like /etc/shadow and environment variables containing API keys and database credentials.

Technologies: vibe-trading-ai (PyPI). Vendors: PyPI.

Quick answers

Is This vulnerability exploited in the wild?
No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of This vulnerability being exploited in the wild.
How severe is This vulnerability?
High severity, with a CVSS score of 7.5, published 2 October 2026.
Which products and versions are affected?
vibe-trading-ai (PyPI) >= 0.1.0, < 0.1.7; Vibe-Trading all versions prior to patch.
Is there a fix for This vulnerability?
No fixed version is recorded yet. Drop the FastAPI process to a non-root user (add RUN useradd -m vibe && chown -R vibe /app and USER vibe to Dockerfile) to reduce credential-extraction blast radius. Replace the Path.home() ∪ Path.cwd() envelope in safe_user_path() with an explicit allowlist of operator-configured directories (e.g. BROKER_EXPORTS_DIR env var), and add missing safe_path() call to read_document() before path.exists() checks. If you run it, Junglewise drafts a mitigation that fits your setup and applies it once you approve, with senior security engineers behind it.
How is This vulnerability attacked?
It is attacked over the network, in a web application.
Am I affected?
Check whether you run vibe-trading-ai (PyPI) or Vibe-Trading at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.

How to fix

Drop the FastAPI process to a non-root user (add RUN useradd -m vibe && chown -R vibe /app and USER vibe to Dockerfile) to reduce credential-extraction blast radius. Replace the Path.home() ∪ Path.cwd() envelope in safe_user_path() with an explicit allowlist of operator-configured directories (e.g. BROKER_EXPORTS_DIR env var), and add missing safe_path() call to read_document() before path.exists() checks.

Technical details

Finding 9 (safe_user_path): Path traversal via overly-broad envelope check in safe_user_path() that accepts any file under Path.home() (/root) or Path.cwd() (/app), leaking credential files and SSH keys via parse-error messages. Finding 10 (read_document): Arbitrary file read with no sandbox enforcement—read_document() accepts any path, runs only existence checks, and returns full file contents including /etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, and /proc/self/environ. Both are reachable via anonymous TCP to port 8899 and via prompt injection. The process runs as root, maximizing blast radius.

Affected products

  • Vibe-Trading Vibe-Trading all versions prior to patch

Timeline

  • 2026-10-02: disclosed

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