trigger.dev Self-Hosted unauthenticated magic link forgery via hardcoded secrets

Severity: high · Published 2026-10-02

trigger.dev is a workflow automation platform; self-hosted v4 deployments using default Docker configuration contain hardcoded cryptographic secrets that allow attackers to forge authentication tokens without email delivery. An unauthenticated attacker can impersonate any user, create admin accounts, and gain complete access to the infrastructure including databases, Redis, and ClickHouse, exposing all tenant data and encrypted secrets.

Technologies: trigger.dev (npm), Trigger.dev. Vendors: npm, Trigger.dev.

Quick answers

Is This vulnerability exploited in the wild?
No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of This vulnerability being exploited in the wild.
How severe is This vulnerability?
High severity, published 2 October 2026.
Which products and versions are affected?
trigger.dev (npm) <= 4.5.5; Trigger.dev v4 with default Docker Compose configuration.
Is there a fix for This vulnerability?
No fixed version is recorded yet. Replace all hardcoded secrets in .env with unique randomly generated values; enable WHITELISTED_EMAILS to restrict user creation; use strong credentials for PostgreSQL, Redis, and ClickHouse; ensure database and cache services are not accessible from runner networks or the public internet; implement network segmentation to isolate infrastructure services from application containers.</anigation> <parameter name="timeline">[{"kind": "disclosed", "at": "2024-10-02"}] If you run it, Junglewise drafts a mitigation that fits your setup and applies it once you approve, with senior security engineers behind it.
How is This vulnerability attacked?
It is attacked over the network, in a hosted service.
Am I affected?
Check whether you run trigger.dev (npm) or Trigger.dev at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.

How to fix

Replace all hardcoded secrets in .env with unique randomly generated values; enable WHITELISTED_EMAILS to restrict user creation; use strong credentials for PostgreSQL, Redis, and ClickHouse; ensure database and cache services are not accessible from runner networks or the public internet; implement network segmentation to isolate infrastructure services from application containers.</anigation> <parameter name="timeline">[{"kind": "disclosed", "at": "2024-10-02"}]

Technical details

The vulnerability is a magic link forgery attack via hardcoded MAGIC_LINK_SECRET in the example .env file. The remix-auth-email-link library uses this secret to encrypt email tokens; an attacker knowing the secret can forge valid AES-encrypted tokens for any email address. Since validateSessionMagicLink defaults to false and WHITELISTED_EMAILS is unset by default, accounts auto-create on first login, allowing unauthorized user creation and session hijacking. Combined with default database/Redis credentials and runner containers on shared infrastructure networks, this enables complete compromise.

Affected products

  • trigger.dev trigger.dev v4 with default Docker Compose configuration

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