ip-address Address6 regex denial of service

Severity: medium · CVSS 4 · Published 2026-10-18

The npm ip-address library is used to validate and parse IPv6 addresses. A vulnerability in how it matches zone identifiers using an inefficient regular expression allows an attacker to submit a specially crafted input string that causes the application to consume excessive CPU and become unresponsive. This can affect any service that validates user-supplied IP addresses without length checks.

Technologies: Beaugunderson Ip-Address, ip-address (npm). Vendors: Beaugunderson, npm.

Quick answers

Is This vulnerability exploited in the wild?
No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of This vulnerability being exploited in the wild.
How severe is This vulnerability?
Medium severity, with a CVSS score of 4, published 18 October 2026.
Which products and versions are affected?
Beau Gunderson Ip-Address <= 10.7.3; Beaugunderson Ip-Address <= 10.7.3; ip-address (npm) <= 10.7.3, SEMVER:introduced=0,last_affected=10.7.3.
Is there a fix for This vulnerability?
Yes: fixed in 10.7.4. Until then: Reject candidate IP addresses longer than 64 characters before passing them to the parser. Junglewise finds every place you run it, drafts the upgrade and applies it once you approve.
How is This vulnerability attacked?
It is attacked over the network, in a software library.
Am I affected?
Check whether you run Beau Gunderson Ip-Address, Beaugunderson Ip-Address or ip-address (npm) at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.

How to fix

  • Fixed in: 10.7.4

Reject candidate IP addresses longer than 64 characters before passing them to the parser.

Technical details

The Address6 constructor uses a regex pattern (/%.*$/) to strip zone identifiers that exhibits quadratic time complexity when processing input containing many % characters followed by a line terminator. Each % character triggers a new regex match attempt, with backtracking proportional to the remaining string length, resulting in O(N²) behavior. An attacker can stall the synchronous parsing with a single request containing 100,000 characters in under 4 seconds of blocking CPU time.

Affected products

  • beaugunderson ip-address <= 10.7.3

Timeline

  • 2026-10-11: disclosed
  • 2026-10-11: patched: fixed in version 10.7.4
  • 2026-10-18: advisory

References

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