Executive brief
OpenChoreo's cluster-gateway is a control-plane component that manages requests to Kubernetes clusters across multiple data planes. The internal management APIs expose no authentication, allowing any network-adjacent user to read sensitive configuration data (database passwords, API keys, TLS certificates), modify or delete workloads, and execute arbitrary commands in pods across all connected clusters. Organizations relying on this for multi-tenant or multi-region deployments face potential data breaches and operational disruption.
Technical details
The cluster-gateway internal listener lacks caller authentication entirely, and its request validator permits both mutating HTTP methods (POST, PUT, DELETE) and reads of Secrets in tenant namespaces—contradicting the client library's documentation marking these as "read-only." An attacker reaching the internal listener (network reachability depends on deployment configuration) can tunneled access to connected data-plane Kubernetes APIs with no per-caller access control. Attack preconditions include network reachability to the internal listener; no client certificate, token, or privileges are required. Exploitation allows secret exfiltration (database credentials, cloud/KMS keys, TLS private keys), workload tampering, and pod exec. The vulnerability is compounded by being a compensating authorization layer missing from GHSA-52gf-6rpq-fgmx. Patches are available in versions 1.0.3, 1.1.3, and 1.2.0; upgrade paths are documented.
Affected products
- OpenChoreo cluster-gateway < 1.0.3, >= 1.1.0 < 1.1.3, >= 1.2.0-rc.1 < 1.2.0-rc.2
Timeline
- 2026-07-27: disclosed: Initial advisory published on GitHub
- 2026-09-04: patched: Patches released: v1.0.3, v1.1.3, v1.2.0
- 2026-09-04: advisory: CVE-2026-73842 assigned and advisory finalized