CVE-2026-73136: ZenHive mpp authentication bypass in capture-replay

CVE-2026-73136 · Severity: high · CVSS 7.5 · Published 2026-08-19

ZenHive mpp is a cryptocurrency payment processor that validates transfers to unlock access to paid resources. An attacker can bypass authentication by replaying a legitimate transfer made by another customer, allowing unauthorized access to paid services without making a payment. The vulnerability stems from insufficient validation of transaction ownership when static memo values are configured, enabling attackers to reuse transaction hashes across different requests.

Technologies: ZenHive Machine Payments Protocol, ZenHive Mpp. Vendors: ZenHive.

Quick answers

Is CVE-2026-73136 exploited in the wild?
No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of CVE-2026-73136 being exploited in the wild.
How severe is CVE-2026-73136?
High severity, with a CVSS score of 7.5, published 19 August 2026.
Which products and versions are affected?
ZenHive Mpp 0.6.1 to 0.6.3.
Is there a fix for CVE-2026-73136?
A patch was published on 2026: Fixed in version 0.6.4 Junglewise finds every place you run it, drafts the upgrade and applies it once you approve.
How is CVE-2026-73136 attacked?
It is attacked over the network, in a software library.
Am I affected by CVE-2026-73136?
Check whether you run ZenHive Machine Payments Protocol or ZenHive Mpp at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.

Technical details

The vulnerability is an authentication bypass in MPP.Methods.Tempo's transaction verification logic. When a static "memo" value is configured in method_config, the check_matched_memo_binding/3 function unconditionally returns a match and skips nonce-based transaction binding, relying only on token, recipient, amount, and static memo values. Since static memos are echoed in unauthenticated 402 responses and Tempo transfers are publicly visible on-chain, an attacker can capture any legitimate transfer matching these criteria, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present the captured transaction hash as a type="hash" credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature verification, allowing an unauthenticated user to claim ownership of any observed transfer. This is fixed in version 0.6.4 and later.

Affected products

  • ZenHive mpp 0.6.1 to 0.6.3

Timeline

  • 2026-08-19: disclosed
  • 2026: patched: Fixed in version 0.6.4

References

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