Executive brief
Dockge is a self-hosted Docker Compose stack manager. An authenticated user can manipulate stack names to traverse outside the intended stacks directory, allowing them to read environment files and Compose configurations from arbitrary locations on the server—disclosing secrets—or delete those directories. When authentication is disabled, this vulnerability can be exploited without any credentials.
Technical details
The vulnerability is a path traversal flaw in stack name validation. The validate() function in backend/stack.ts enforces an allow-list regex (^[a-z0-9_-]+$) only on the write path (save() method), but the getter and Stack.getStack() lack checks and construct file paths using unsanitized stack names via path.join(). Socket handlers in docker-socket-handler.ts authenticate the caller but pass the stack name directly to Stack.getStack without validation. An attacker can inject traversal sequences (e.g., "../../../") to read or delete files outside the managed stacks directory. Exploitation requires authentication unless disableAuth is enabled. The impact is limited to disclosure of .env and Compose files and deletion of directories containing valid Compose files.
Affected products
- Louis Lam Dockge before 1.5.1
Timeline
- 2026-08-20: disclosed