Executive brief
A security flaw in Docker Desktop allows users to bypass 'Enhanced Container Isolation' (ECI) protections. This feature is intended to restrict containers from accessing the underlying host system's Docker engine. By exploiting this bypass, a local user or a compromised container can gain full control over the Docker environment and potentially access sensitive authentication credentials stored on the host.
Technical details
A vulnerability in the Docker Desktop API proxy allows a bypass of Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) when the --use-api-socket flag is used. ECI is designed to block Docker socket mounts unless explicitly permitted; however, the enforcement mechanism only inspected the 'HostConfig.Binds' field. The --use-api-socket flag utilizes the 'HostConfig.Mounts' field instead, which was not validated by the proxy. A local attacker with low-privileged access can exploit this to mount the Docker Engine socket, escaping container isolation and potentially escalating privileges or stealing host-level registry credentials. The issue is fixed in Docker Desktop version 4.59.0.
Affected products
- Docker Docker Desktop 4.41.0 to 4.58.x (fixed in 4.59.0)
Timeline
- 2026-01-09: other: Vulnerability reported to vendor
- 2026-04-23: patched: Coordinated public release of advisory and fix in 4.59.0
- 2026-05-22: advisory: NVD publication date