Quick answers
- Is CVE-2026-63202 exploited in the wild?
- No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of CVE-2026-63202 being exploited in the wild.
- How severe is CVE-2026-63202?
- High severity, with a CVSS score of 7.5, published 20 August 2026.
- Which products and versions are affected?
- io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp (Maven) <= 0.0.22.Final, ECOSYSTEM:introduced=0,fixed=0.0.23.Final; Netty Project Netty Incubator Codec OHTTP <= 0.0.22.Final.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-63202?
- Yes. io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp (Maven): upgrade to 0.0.23.Final or later. Junglewise finds every place you run it, drafts the upgrade and applies it once you approve.
- How is CVE-2026-63202 attacked?
- It is attacked over the network, in a software library.
- Am I affected by CVE-2026-63202?
- Check whether you run io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp (Maven) or Netty Project Netty Incubator Codec OHTTP at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.
How to fix
- io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp (Maven): upgrade to 0.0.23.Final or later
# set io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp to 0.0.23.Final in your pom.xml or build.gradle
Technical details
The vulnerability is a control-flow bug in BinaryHttpParser.readFieldSection() (lines 619–626). The field-section decoding loop terminates on condition `fieldSectionLength != 0` and relies on two Java assertions to prevent infinite loops. Two cooperating defects enable the hang: (1) if readFieldLine() consumes more bytes than the declared field-section length, the loop counter goes negative and remains != 0 forever; (2) readFieldLine() can legitimately return null without consuming bytes when the buffer is incomplete, causing zero-progress iterations and a tight busy spin. The assert statements (lines 622, 624) that guard against these cases are disabled by default in production JVMs (assertions require -ea flag). The vulnerability is reachable from OHttpServerCodec.decode() and OHttpRequestResponseContext.ContentDecoder.decodeChunk(), which feed decrypted attacker-controlled OHTTP request bodies directly to the parser. A ~17-byte binary message suffices to trigger the hang. Patches are available in version 0.0.23.Final.
Affected products
- Netty Project netty-incubator-codec-ohttp <= 0.0.22.Final
Identifiers
- CVE-2026-63202
- GHSA-4899-mpch-38p3
Timeline
- 2026-07-18: disclosed
- 2026-08-20: advisory
- 2026: patched: version 0.0.23.Final