# CVE-2026-58370: Woodpecker CI approval bypass via spoofed GitLab commit author

Source: https://junglewise.ai/threats/cve-2026-58370-woodpecker-ci-approval-bypass-via-spoofed-gitlab-commit-author  
Publisher: Junglewise Threat Intelligence, https://junglewise.ai/threats  
Published: 2026-06-30. Updated: 2026-06-30  
License: CC BY 4.0 with a link back

CVE-2026-58370 · Severity: high · CVSS 8.1 · Published 2026-06-30

Woodpecker, a continuous integration (CI) engine, contains a security flaw in how it handles code contributions from GitLab. An attacker can bypass the required security approval process for new code by spoofing a trusted user's name in a commit. This allows unauthorized code to run automatically on company infrastructure, potentially leading to the theft of sensitive credentials or secrets used in the software building process.

Technologies: [Woodpecker CI Woodpecker](https://junglewise.ai/threats/technologies/woodpecker). Vendors: [Woodpecker CI](https://junglewise.ai/threats/vendors/woodpecker-ci).

## Quick answers

**Is CVE-2026-58370 exploited in the wild?** No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of CVE-2026-58370 being exploited in the wild.

**How severe is CVE-2026-58370?** High severity, with a CVSS score of 8.1, published 30 June 2026.

**Which products and versions are affected?** Woodpecker CI Woodpecker < 3.15.0.

**Is there a fix for CVE-2026-58370?** A patch was published on 2026-05-27: Fix merged via Pull Request #6653 Junglewise finds every place you run it, drafts the upgrade and applies it once you approve.

**How is CVE-2026-58370 attacked?** It is attacked over the network, in a hosted service.

**Am I affected by CVE-2026-58370?** Check whether you run Woodpecker CI Woodpecker at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.

## Technical details

In Woodpecker versions prior to 3.15.0, the GitLab forge driver populates the 'pipeline.Author' field using the 'commit.author.name' value from incoming webhook payloads. Because GitLab does not verify this specific field and Woodpecker matches it directly against the 'ApprovalAllowedUsers' bypass list, an attacker can craft a commit with a name matching a trusted user. This causes the 'needsApproval' check to return false, allowing the execution of arbitrary pipeline steps on a Woodpecker agent. This bypass is specific to the GitLab driver; other drivers like GitHub and Gitea use validated actor identities. The issue is resolved in version 3.15.0 by switching to the validated GitLab username.

## Affected products

- woodpecker-ci Woodpecker < 3.15.0

## Timeline

- 2026-05-27: patched: Fix merged via Pull Request #6653
- 2026-05-28: advisory: Release v3.15.0 published
- 2026-06-30: disclosed: CVE-2026-58370 published

## References

- [https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/commit/98faae778c953678944996c89ed99307d2f16a3d](https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/commit/98faae778c953678944996c89ed99307d2f16a3d)
- [https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/pull/6653](https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/pull/6653)
- [https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/releases/tag/v3.15.0](https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/releases/tag/v3.15.0)
- [https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/woodpecker-gitlab-approval-gate-bypass-via-spoofable-commit-author-name](https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/woodpecker-gitlab-approval-gate-bypass-via-spoofable-commit-author-name)

## Related threats

- [Woodpecker CI agent impersonation via gRPC metadata injection](https://junglewise.ai/threats/cve-2026-50141-woodpecker-ci-agent-impersonation-via-grpc-metadata-injection)