Executive brief
OpenShift Migration Advisor is a tool used by enterprises to plan and execute migrations of virtual machines to Kubernetes. The agent-API component failed to validate that authenticated agents could only modify data for their assigned tenant, allowing any authenticated agent with a valid token to read and overwrite inventory data, inject malicious credentials, or corrupt migration assessments for any other tenant. This completely breaks tenant isolation and could expose confidential migration data or sabotage production migrations.
Technical details
The vulnerability is an authorization bypass (CWE-639) in the agent-API middleware of migration-planner. Each agent carries a JWT with a source_id claim identifying the single source it should manage. While the middleware validates JWT signatures and stores claims in context, the UpdateSourceInventory and UpdateAgentStatus handler functions in internal/handlers/v1alpha1/agent.go never check the source_id claim from the JWT—they trust only the source ID from the URL path or request body. An attacker with any valid agent token can supply arbitrary source IDs to modify inventory for other tenants. The fix (merged in commit fd21a23, released in version 0.13.5) adds JWT source_id validation by reading auth.MustHaveAgent(ctx).SourceID in both handlers and returning HTTP 403 when it does not match the target source. Attack requires network access and valid agent authentication; no user interaction needed. Scope is changed (affects other tenants' data).
Affected products
- kubev2v migration-planner < 0.13.5
Timeline
- 2026-06-10: disclosed
- 2026-06-02: patched: Patch merged to main branch (commit fd21a23); version 0.13.5 released
- 2026-06-10: advisory: GitHub Advisory GHSA-2fqw-7c6r-2cq6 published