Executive brief
The OpenTelemetry Sentry exporter, which sends monitoring data to Sentry, contains a flaw that allows an attacker to manipulate the destination of that data. By sending specially crafted application names, an attacker can trick the exporter into accessing unauthorized parts of the Sentry management interface or redirecting sensitive monitoring information to an attacker-controlled project. This could lead to the exposure of internal operational data or unauthorized access to organization settings within Sentry.
Technical details
The Sentry exporter in OpenTelemetry Collector Contrib fails to sanitize the 'service.name' resource attribute before interpolating it into Sentry API URLs via fmt.Sprintf. Because 'service.name' is controlled by remote OTLP senders, an attacker can inject path traversal sequences (e.g., '../') or query parameters (e.g., '?') into the URL. Since the exporter attaches a privileged operator bearer token to every request, this allows the attacker to reach arbitrary GET-based Sentry API endpoints, such as organization member lists or administrative settings. Additionally, an attacker can redirect telemetry data to their own Sentry project by manipulating the project slug. The vulnerability is fixed in version 0.154.0 by applying regex validation to runtime-derived slugs.
Affected products
- OpenTelemetry opentelemetry-collector-contrib/exporter/sentryexporter < 0.154.0
Timeline
- 2026-06-17: disclosed
- 2026-06-18: advisory: GitHub Advisory published
- 2026-06-18: patched: Version 0.154.0 released