Executive brief
A security flaw in the automated deployment process of Duck Site allows unauthorized individuals to push malicious code directly to the live production website. By submitting a specially crafted pull request, an attacker can bypass the normal review and merge process, tricking the system into building and deploying their unapproved changes. This could lead to website defacement, the theft of user credentials, or the distribution of malicious software to site visitors.
Technical details
The vulnerability exists in the GitHub Actions CI/CD pipeline where a privileged 'deploy' workflow is triggered by the completion of a 'build' workflow. The deploy workflow incorrectly uses the commit SHA from the triggering pull request rather than the trusted main branch. If an attacker names their source branch 'main' in a fork and submits a pull request, the deployment logic's branch condition is satisfied. This allows the attacker's code to be built into a Docker image, pushed to the GitHub Container Registry (GHCR) as 'latest', and deployed via Dokploy without any manual approval or code merge. This is a supply-chain compromise resulting from the inclusion of functionality from an untrusted control sphere (CWE-829).
Affected products
- duck-organization Duck Site < 1.0.1
Timeline
- 2026-05-17: advisory: GitHub Security Advisory published by maintainers
- 2026-06-11: disclosed: CVE published to NVD