Executive brief
Apache Airflow, a platform used to schedule and monitor workflows, is vulnerable to a flaw that allows users who can author workflows (DAGs) to access or overwrite sensitive files on the server. By creating malicious links or manipulating task identifiers, an attacker could read system configuration files or disrupt operations. This issue primarily affects environments where the workflow execution engine and the management interface share the same storage for logs.
Technical details
A vulnerability in Apache Airflow's FileTaskHandler allows a DAG author to perform arbitrary file reads or writes. The 'read-path' attack involves creating a symbolic link within a task's log directory that points to sensitive files (e.g., /etc/passwd) readable by the API server. The 'write-path' attack utilizes '..' sequences in a task_id to bypass the Task SDK's KEY_REGEX, leading to path traversal. Both methods allow the FileTaskHandler to resolve paths outside the intended 'base_log_folder'. This exploit is possible in deployments where the worker log folder is shared with the API server. The issue is fixed in version 3.2.2 by canonicalizing paths and validating that resolved paths remain within the base log directory.
Affected products
- Apache Airflow < 3.2.2
Timeline
- 2026-04-16: patched: Pull request merged into main branch
- 2026-05-31: disclosed: Initial disclosure on oss-security mailing list
- 2026-06-01: advisory: GitHub Advisory and NVD entry published