Executive brief
OpenClaw is a service discovery and routing system that uses DNS-based beacons to help clients locate network gateways. The vulnerability allows an attacker on a shared network to advertise fake discovery records without authentication, potentially tricking clients into connecting to attacker-controlled servers or accepting forged certificates. This could lead to interception of credentials and data exfiltration, though practical impact is currently limited to alpha testing builds.
Technical details
The vulnerability is an insufficient data authenticity verification issue (CWE-345) in OpenClaw's discovery mechanism. Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD TXT records (lanHost, tailnetDns, gatewayPort, gatewayTlsSha256) are transmitted unauthenticated. Prior to patching, iOS/macOS clients used TXT-provided host hints and ports to construct connection URLs, and iOS/Android clients allowed discovery-provided TLS fingerprints to override stored certificate pins. An attacker on a shared/untrusted LAN can advertise a rogue _openclaw-gw._tcp service, causing clients to connect to an attacker endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials. Attack vector is adjacent (LAN-based). The fix (v2026.2.14+) prioritizes resolved service endpoints over TXT hints, prevents discovery fingerprints from overriding pins, requires explicit user confirmation for first-time pins, enforces TLS-only for discovery-based connections, and restores hostname verification on Android.
Affected products
- OpenClaw openclaw <= 2026.2.13
Timeline
- 2026-02-18: disclosed: Published in GitHub Advisory Database
- 2026-02-14: patched: Planned fix for version 2026.2.14 (not yet published at time of disclosure)