Executive brief
OpenClaw's BlueBubbles iMessage integration plugin accepts webhook requests as legitimate based solely on whether they originate from the local machine (127.0.0.1), bypassing authentication checks even when a webhook password is missing or incorrect. An attacker who can send requests from the same host—via a reverse proxy misconfiguration or through an application vulnerability—can inject unauthorized messages into the system, potentially disrupting communications or compromising message handling workflows.
Technical details
The vulnerability is an authentication bypass in the BlueBubbles webhook handler (CWE-863). The vulnerable code accepts webhook requests as authenticated solely based on the TCP peer address being a loopback address (127.0.0.1, ::1, or ::ffff:127.0.0.1), without verifying the configured webhook secret. An attacker with network access to a same-host reverse proxy, or who can exploit an SSRF vulnerability to reach the loopback interface, can inject unauthorized webhook events into the agent pipeline without providing valid credentials. The issue was patched in version 2026.2.13 (commits f836c385ffc746cb954e8ee409f99d079bfdcd2f and 743f4b28495cdeb0d5bf76f6ebf4af01f6a02e5a). Mitigation includes setting a non-empty webhook password and avoiding proxy configurations that forward external traffic to loopback-bound endpoints without upstream authentication.
Affected products
- OpenClaw openclaw < 2026.2.13
- OpenClaw @openclaw/bluebubbles < 2026.2.13
Timeline
- 2026-02-17: disclosed: Published on OSV and GitHub Advisory Database
- 2026-02-13: patched: Fix released in version 2026.2.13