CVE-2026-16093: Red Hat Keycloak Client Policy bypass in keycloak-services

CVE-2026-16093 · Severity: medium · CVSS 5.4 · Published 2026-07-17

Keycloak, a popular identity and access management solution, contains a flaw in its security policy enforcement. Administrators can set policies requiring clients to use secure, signed digital signatures (JWTs) for authentication; however, this protection can be bypassed. An attacker with basic client credentials can use a fake, unsigned header to trick the system into accepting less secure authentication methods, potentially undermining the organization's security standards for application access.

Technologies: Red Hat build of Keycloak, Red Hat Data Grid 8, Red Hat Single Sign-On 7. Vendors: Red Hat.

Quick answers

Is CVE-2026-16093 exploited in the wild?
No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of CVE-2026-16093 being exploited in the wild.
How severe is CVE-2026-16093?
Medium severity, with a CVSS score of 5.4, published 17 July 2026.
Which products and versions are affected?
Red Hat Build of Keycloak; Red Hat Single Sign-On 7; Red Hat Data Grid 8; Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Expansion Pack.
Is there a fix for CVE-2026-16093?
No fixed version is recorded yet. Check the vendor's advisory in the references below. If you run it, Junglewise drafts a mitigation that fits your setup and applies it once you approve, with senior security engineers behind it.
How is CVE-2026-16093 attacked?
It is attacked over the network, in a software library.
Am I affected by CVE-2026-16093?
Check whether you run Red Hat build of Keycloak, Red Hat Data Grid 8 or Red Hat Single Sign-On 7. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.

Technical details

A vulnerability in the Secure Client Registration executor within the keycloak-services component allows for a bypass of the signed-JWT assertion policy. The root cause is located in the SecureSigningAlgorithmForSignedJwtExecutor, which incorrectly validates only the 'alg' field in the raw JWT header without verifying the presence of a valid client assertion type or ensuring the client's authenticator is assertion-based. By submitting a crafted request with an unsigned assertion header containing a valid 'alg' field, an authenticated attacker can bypass signature verification. This enables the use of simpler authentication methods (like client secrets) even when administrative policies mandate signed assertions.

Affected products

  • Red Hat Build of Keycloak
  • Red Hat Single Sign-On 7
  • Red Hat Data Grid 8
  • Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Expansion Pack

Timeline

  • 2026-07-17: disclosed
  • 2026-07-17: advisory

References

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