CVE-2026-121619: Symfony FrameworkBundle IP spoofing via trusted_proxies

CVE-2026-121619 · Severity: info · Published 2026-11-12

Symfony's trusted proxy configuration can be abused to spoof client IP addresses, hostnames, and connection schemes when using the "private_ranges" shortcut. An attacker can forge X-Forwarded-* headers to bypass IP-based access controls, poison password reset emails, or bypass HTTPS enforcement, affecting web applications that rely on this configuration for reverse proxy support.

Vendors: Symfony.

Quick answers

Is CVE-2026-121619 exploited in the wild?
No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of CVE-2026-121619 being exploited in the wild.
How severe is CVE-2026-121619?
Informational severity, published 12 November 2026.
Which products and versions are affected?
Symfony FrameworkBundle 7.1 prior to 7.4.23; 8.x prior to 8.1.11; Symfony HttpFoundation 7.2 prior to 7.4.23; 8.x prior to 8.1.11.
Is there a fix for CVE-2026-121619?
Yes: fixed in FrameworkBundle 7.4.23, 8.1.11; HttpFoundation 7.4.23, 8.1.11. Until then: Do not use the private_ranges shortcut with trusted_proxies configuration; instead explicitly list the IP address ranges of your legitimate reverse proxies. Applications on Symfony 6.4 are unaffected by default unless they explicitly pass IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS to Request::setTrustedProxies(). Junglewise finds every place you run it, drafts the upgrade and applies it once you approve.
How is CVE-2026-121619 attacked?
It is attacked over the network, in a software library.
Am I affected by CVE-2026-121619?
Check whether you run Symfony FrameworkBundle or Symfony HttpFoundation at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.

How to fix

  • Fixed in: FrameworkBundle 7.4.23, 8.1.11; HttpFoundation 7.4.23, 8.1.11

Do not use the private_ranges shortcut with trusted_proxies configuration; instead explicitly list the IP address ranges of your legitimate reverse proxies. Applications on Symfony 6.4 are unaffected by default unless they explicitly pass IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS to Request::setTrustedProxies().

Technical details

The private_ranges keyword in framework.trusted_proxies and Request::setTrustedProxies() mistakenly includes IPv6 prefixes that embed IPv4 addresses (IPv4-mapped, 6to4, Teredo, NAT64). Remote attackers can connect using these source addresses and have their X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, and X-Forwarded-Proto headers trusted as if they were behind a legitimate reverse proxy. Vulnerable deployments include IPv6 servers without IPV6_V6ONLY set (exposing all IPv4 clients) and servers accessible over globally-routed IPv6 (6to4/Teredo space).

Affected products

  • Symfony FrameworkBundle 7.1 prior to 7.4.23; 8.x prior to 8.1.11
  • Symfony HttpFoundation 7.2 prior to 7.4.23; 8.x prior to 8.1.11

Timeline

  • 2026-11-12: disclosed
  • 2026-11-12: patched: Fixed in 7.4.23 and 8.1.11

This page as Markdown. Free to reuse under CC BY 4.0 with a link back.