Quick answers
- Is CVE-2026-118515 exploited in the wild?
- No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of CVE-2026-118515 being exploited in the wild.
- How severe is CVE-2026-118515?
- Informational severity, published 6 November 2026.
- Which products and versions are affected?
- Symfony Serializer component prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, 8.x prior to 8.1.11.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-118515?
- Yes: fixed in Symfony 5.4.56, 6.4.50, 7.4.23, 8.1.11. Until then: Ensure DataUriNormalizer is configured ahead of ObjectNormalizer in the serializer; the default FrameworkBundle configuration is protected by this fix. Avoid deserializing untrusted data into types with UploadedFile properties, particularly when using #[MapRequestPayload] on DTOs without authentication checks. Junglewise finds every place you run it, drafts the upgrade and applies it once you approve.
- How is CVE-2026-118515 attacked?
- It is attacked over the network, in a software library.
- Am I affected by CVE-2026-118515?
- Check whether you run Symfony Serializer component at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.
How to fix
- Fixed in: Symfony 5.4.56, 6.4.50, 7.4.23, 8.1.11
Ensure DataUriNormalizer is configured ahead of ObjectNormalizer in the serializer; the default FrameworkBundle configuration is protected by this fix. Avoid deserializing untrusted data into types with UploadedFile properties, particularly when using #[MapRequestPayload] on DTOs without authentication checks.
Technical details
The DataUriNormalizer only recognizes exact types SplFileInfo, SplFileObject, and File, so subclasses like UploadedFile bypass the normalizer and are instantiated through ObjectNormalizer with attacker-controlled constructor arguments including arbitrary file paths. By setting test: true in the request payload, UploadedFile::isValid() skips the is_uploaded_file() check, and move() falls back to rename(), allowing arbitrary file operations. File validation assertions do not prevent this since they validate against the attacker-chosen path on the server.
Affected products
- Symfony Serializer component prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, 8.x prior to 8.1.11
Timeline
- 2026-11-06: disclosed