Quick answers
- Is CVE-2026-113957 exploited in the wild?
- No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of CVE-2026-113957 being exploited in the wild.
- How severe is CVE-2026-113957?
- Informational severity, published 29 October 2026.
- Which products and versions are affected?
- Apple Container before 1.6.0; Apple Containerization before 0.52.1.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-113957?
- Yes: fixed in Container 1.6.0, Containerization 0.52.1. Until then: Pull only from trusted registries and mirrors over TLS; do not use unencrypted HTTP (--scheme http) for pinned images. After upgrading, identify and re-pull any compromised images using the provided command: container image list --format json | jq -r '.[] | select(.configuration.name | test("@sha256:")) | select((.configuration.name | split("@") | last) != .configuration.descriptor.digest) | .configuration.name' Junglewise finds every place you run it, drafts the upgrade and applies it once you approve.
- How is CVE-2026-113957 attacked?
- It is attacked over the network or from the adjacent network, in a software library.
- Am I affected by CVE-2026-113957?
- Check whether you run Apple Container or Apple Containerization at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.
How to fix
- Fixed in: Container 1.6.0, Containerization 0.52.1
Pull only from trusted registries and mirrors over TLS; do not use unencrypted HTTP (--scheme http) for pinned images. After upgrading, identify and re-pull any compromised images using the provided command: container image list --format json | jq -r '.[] | select(.configuration.name | test("@sha256:")) | select((.configuration.name | split("@") | last) != .configuration.descriptor.digest) | .configuration.name'
Technical details
When pulling an image by digest, the packages trusted the Docker-Content-Digest response header from the registry instead of validating it against the pinned digest provided by the user. An attacker with control over the registry, mirror, or network path (absent TLS) could return an arbitrary manifest and all subsequent content validation would pass. The fix compares the returned digest against the pinned digest and fails the pull on mismatch, and adds manifest and blob hash verification.
Affected products
- Apple Container before 1.6.0
- Apple Containerization before 0.52.1
Timeline
- 2026-10-20: disclosed
- 2026-10-29: advisory