CVE-2026-112027: light0011 cms path traversal in Uploadify check-exists

CVE-2026-112027 · Severity: medium · CVSS 5.3 · Published 2026-10-18

light0011 cms is a news content management system built on PHP and ThinkPHP. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit a legacy file existence check endpoint to discover whether arbitrary files exist on the server, including sensitive system files, by bypassing directory restrictions through path traversal. This information disclosure can be used to refine subsequent attacks or identify valuable targets.

Technologies: Light0011 CMS. Vendors: Light0011.

Quick answers

Is CVE-2026-112027 exploited in the wild?
No. Junglewise Threat Intelligence has no report of CVE-2026-112027 being exploited in the wild.
How severe is CVE-2026-112027?
Medium severity, with a CVSS score of 5.3, published 18 October 2026.
Which products and versions are affected?
Light0011 CMS commit f72cf46f601efb2a0618c3814cc2f61380b38930 and earlier.
Is there a fix for CVE-2026-112027?
No fixed version is recorded yet. Remove the legacy check-exists.php endpoint if it is not required for functionality. If the file existence check is necessary, implement path canonicalization to verify the resolved path remains within the intended upload directory, and add authentication or request signing.</anigation> </invoke> If you run it, Junglewise drafts a mitigation that fits your setup and applies it once you approve, with senior security engineers behind it.
How is CVE-2026-112027 attacked?
It is attacked over the network, in a web application.
Am I affected by CVE-2026-112027?
Check whether you run Light0011 CMS at an affected version. Junglewise does that check for you around the clock: connect your code, cloud and domains, and it matches new vulnerabilities like this one against what you actually run and tells you when one reaches you.

How to fix

Remove the legacy check-exists.php endpoint if it is not required for functionality. If the file existence check is necessary, implement path canonicalization to verify the resolved path remains within the intended upload directory, and add authentication or request signing.</anigation> </invoke>

Technical details

The check-exists.php endpoint in the Uploadify component fails to normalize or validate the filename parameter before passing it to file_exists() with a user-controlled path. Path traversal sequences (../) are not filtered, allowing an attacker to escape the intended upload directory and probe for the existence of files anywhere on the filesystem. The HTTP response directly leaks whether each queried path exists (1 for present, 0 for absent), creating a reliable oracle for unauthenticated filesystem reconnaissance.

Affected products

  • light0011 cms commit f72cf46f601efb2a0618c3814cc2f61380b38930 and earlier

Timeline

  • 2026-07-18: disclosed: Issue #15 reported on GitHub
  • 2026-10-18: advisory

References

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