Executive brief
Droidclaw is an AI agent platform used to automate Android devices. A security flaw in its pairing process allows an attacker to bypass rate-limiting protections by spoofing their network identity. This enables an attacker to quickly guess pairing codes, steal a user's API key, and gain full remote control over the victim's Android device without needing any prior login credentials.
Technical details
An authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the `/pairing/claim` endpoint of Droidclaw (up to v0.5.3) due to improper rate limiting. The `isRateLimited()` function in `server/src/routes/pairing.ts` relies on the `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` HTTP headers to identify and throttle clients. Because these headers are attacker-controlled, a remote attacker can rotate spoofed IP addresses to bypass the 5-attempts-per-minute restriction. This allows for a high-speed brute-force attack against the 6-digit pairing code keyspace. A successful guess grants the attacker the victim's API key, leading to full device takeover via the WebSocket API. As of the advisory date, no patch is available.
Affected products
- unitedbyai droidclaw <= 0.5.3
Timeline
- 2026-05-07: disclosed: Issue reported to the project maintainers via GitHub issue #14
- 2026-06-01: advisory: CVE-2026-10216 published by VulDB/NVD