Vulnerabilities

ConnectWise says ScreenConnect attacks continue against unpatched technician clients

Attackers use remote support sessions to reach technician workstations. Patching the ScreenConnect server is not enough: every technician client needs version 26.6.5 or later.

By Junglewise News Desk. Published . Updated

If your business uses ConnectWise ScreenConnect for remote support, or your IT provider uses it to support you, there is work to do this week. ConnectWise says its investigation into unauthorised access to partner ScreenConnect environments is complete, but researchers keep reporting fresh activity against on-premises installations that are still unpatched and still have certain third-party extensions switched on.

The attacks do not go after the ScreenConnect server itself. They go after the technician: an attacker sitting on a remote session pushes a file to the support person's computer, and it runs the moment the technician joins, with no prompt shown. That workstation usually holds remote management consoles, saved credentials and access to every customer, which is why it is worth so much. Huntress put it bluntly: "An MSP technician's workstation typically holds RMM consoles, saved credentials, and access to every customer, making it an exceptionally attractive target."

The underlying flaw, CVE-2026-84869, was fixed on 8 September 2026 in ScreenConnect 26.6.5. Months later, Huntress says it still finds technicians running clients as old as 22.x, 24.2 and 25.8. That gap is what the current campaigns are feeding on.

What to do now

  1. Update every technician client to 26.6.5 or later. This is the critical step. Updating the ScreenConnect server or cloud console does not confirm your technician clients are updated, so check each technician workstation individually. ConnectWise's security bulletin has the detail.
  2. Cloud customers: the upgrade is automatic, but you still need to reinstall host clients and update Access agents afterwards.
  3. On-premises customers: upgrade to 26.6.5 from the Download page with a valid, in-maintenance licence. You must already be on 25.4 or later to go straight to 26.6.5. If you run ConnectWise Automate with a ScreenConnect integration and an active Automate Assurance subscription, 26.6.5 is available through the Automate Product Updates page.
  4. If you cannot patch today, deselect the TransferFiles permission (formerly TransferFilesInSession) for each role under Administration > Security > Roles. ConnectWise describes this as a stopgap, not a substitute for the update.
  5. Disable the named third-party extensions on on-premises installs: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. ConnectWise cannot turn these off in on-premises environments for you, and asks partners not to re-enable or reinstall them until it says otherwise. It also disabled ITBoost Integration, RepairShopr Integration and Guest Session Starter in cloud environments and its marketplace as a precaution, and suggests doing the same on-premises.
  6. Hunt for signs you were already hit. ConnectWise suggests reviewing Run Command history, extension API activity, the list of administrative accounts, any permission changes and Toolbox records for anything nobody recognises. Huntress suggests checking Session.db event logs for exposure. ConnectWise also warned of unusual sign-ins and repeated login failures.
  7. Reset access properly. Invalidate active ScreenConnect and identity-provider sessions, reset credentials and enforce multi-factor authentication. ConnectWise notes that password resets alone do not invalidate every session.
  8. Do not use ScreenConnect to investigate or clean a suspect machine. Use endpoint detection and response or another out-of-band tool. If you suspect compromise, isolate affected servers, preserve backups and keep systems offline until they have been investigated, rebuilt and patched. ConnectWise adds that a compromised ScreenConnect server may not be the only way in, so review the whole environment.

Cleanup is not just a patch. The Record reported ConnectWise's warning that "Disabling extensions and resetting credentials alone may not remove unauthorized software, persistence mechanisms, or access already established on endpoints."

Technical details

CVE-2026-84869 is a missing authorisation and improper privilege management issue (CWE-862 and CWE-269) in the ScreenConnect client. In certain circumstances it lets someone on a live remote session move a file onto the other machine and run it, with no approval from the host. The CVSS 3.1 base score is 9.9 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H). ConnectWise rates the bulletin severity Important and priority 1-High, meaning updates should be treated as emergency changes within days. All versions before 26.6.5 are affected; ScreenConnect servers themselves are not impacted.

The fix shipped on 8 September 2026. CISA added the CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 11 September based on evidence of active exploitation, alongside two unrelated JFrog Artifactory flaws, and ordered federal agencies to fix it within three days. CISA said these kinds of flaws are a frequent route for attackers and a significant risk to federal systems. The directive binds federal agencies only, but CISA urges everyone to prioritise KEV entries. In mid-September, Shadowserver still counted more than 1,000 unpatched instances exposed online, most in North America (758) and Europe (180).

Huntress reports a spray campaign running since at least 20 October. Between 20 October and 16 November it counted roughly 688,000 guest "run file" requests for files named update.bat or update_<8hex>.bat across 42 managed service provider ScreenConnect servers, from 29 source addresses. The worst-hit server saw ten guest sessions from seven addresses generate 70,414 requests over three weeks. On 12 November, a technician workstation was fully compromised about nine seconds after the technician joined a malicious session: a guest-pushed batch file relaunched via PowerShell and WScript, reported the victim to a Telegram bot, ran reconnaissance, downloaded an MSI payload and installed a rebranded ScreenConnect client disguised as Windows Update, connecting to the relay domain masterdarky[.]com. Huntress assesses with high confidence that the sprayer and the operator of that domain are the same, and has published further indicators including a rogue client hash, install paths and sprayer IP addresses. Huntress also found a harmless marker.txt canary test used to confirm the exploit worked, and path traversal used in three real support sessions at one MSP to try to drop a script into a technician's Startup folder. A separate Huntress report on 13 November described unauthorised guest sessions disguised with crypto-exchange names on more than 100 MSP servers.

Related but separate activity involves a toolkit researchers call SCKit. It was reportedly built to move from a compromised endpoint onto the machine of whichever technician connects, and from there to other endpoints. Researchers said they had not seen that spread technique succeed, and ConnectWise says 26.6.5 and later blocks it in both cloud and on-premises deployments. ConnectWise's initial assessment was that the activity may involve abuse of independently developed third-party extensions in the RMM+ family, found in roughly 400 partner environments, and told The Record: "We identified approximately 400 partner environments with at least one independently developed third-party extension from the RMM+ family installed. Their presence alone does not establish compromise". RMM+ gives external management tools an API to drive remote sessions, protected by a passphrase the partner sets. A separate CVE was assigned to the third-party extension issue. Researchers reported RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 could accept an empty access key when none was configured, which ConnectWise said it was assessing.

What is not settled: ConnectWise found no evidence that its own infrastructure was compromised or that a ScreenConnect vulnerability provided initial access, and says it has no telemetry inside partner environments after that point. Blackpoint Cyber researchers Sam Decker and Nevan Beal reverse engineered the toolkit and said "Our testing confirmed that the exploit targets CVE-2026-84869 and that the existing patch successfully blocks it", while cautioning that the toolkit can also hijack authenticated operator sessions, so patching alone does not remove that risk. A Huntress spokesperson told The Record that current telemetry points to stolen credentials or hijacked operator sessions, and that it is still unclear how the attacker obtained panel access.

What changed

  • : Refreshed with ConnectWise saying its investigation is complete, Huntress spray campaign figures through November 16, and corrected unsourced indicator and date details.

On Junglewise Threat Intelligence

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